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COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN CHINA: A POSSIBILITY OR A
PROHIBITION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Those born into Western societies are accustomed to
speaking their minds freely. Westerners view freedom of speech
as a fundamental right. As Christopher Patten, former Governor
of Hong Kong, once said, "free speech is an end in itself, not just a
means to an end. It is intimately connected to human dignity.' In
quoting the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall,
Patten said free speech "served not only the needs of the polity
'but also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-
expression.'"2
In the People's Republic of China (PRC), however, no such
right exists in practice. The government maintains a tight grip on
the things people say and do to express themselves. Consequently,
there exists a pervasive fear among journalists, filmmakers,
Internet Web site creators, and anyone else who may convey a
message that might be unacceptable to the government of the
PRC.3 The repercussions of such perceived "subversion" include
harsh prison sentences, expulsion from the country, or loss of jobs
or businesses. 4  The frequency of these extreme penalties
consistently increases.
5
1. CHRISTOPHER PATTEN, EAST AND WEST: CHINA, POWER, AND THE FUTURE OF
ASIA 233 (1998).
2. Id.
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 106TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999-VOLUME I 1037 (J. Comm. Print 2000) (China)
[hereinafter China Country Report 1999] (discussing an increased tendency of journalists,
writers, and publishers to censor themselves); see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 106TH
CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998-VOLUME I 837,
839 (J. Comm. Print 1999) (China) [hereinafter China Country Report 1998].
4. See Associated Press, Chinese Dissident Prints Copies of Banned Internet Journal,
Is Arrested, THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (Sept. 7, 1999), at
http://www.freedomforum.org/international/1999/9l/qi.asp [hereinafter Dissident Prints
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Freedom of speech is a complicated concept to incorporate
into a socialist system. The PRC's government must maintain an
open attitude and be willing to consider new ideas in order to
make freedom of speech a reality. The international community,
especially Western nations, must try to understand the PRC's
perspective in order to encourage the effective integration of free
speech into Chinese society. In particular, the international
community must examine the role of the media in China, the
country's deep-seated belief system, and the looming political
pressures.
The Chinese people are not strangers to change. They have
witnessed dramatic modifications in their country throughout the
twentieth century. From the fall of the dynasties to the takeover
by the Communist Party,6 the era has teemed with turmoil.
Throughout all of the political pandemonium, however, the PRC
has maintained a rich culture. In fact, even as governmental
oppression stifles creativity, the people of the PRC find new ways
to express themselves.7 Still, doing so could be a dangerous
venture for many artists and journalists who face the Chinese
censor.
8
This Comment analyzes the existence of freedom of speech,
or the lack thereof, within all types of media including the press
(print and electronic), films, and the Internet. 9 The government of
the PRC has a great deal to consider at the dawn of the new
millennium. The government is finding it difficult to regulate the
use of new technologies, like the Internet,10 in such a way that
Copies]; see also Chinese Dissident Arrested for Printing Internet Newsletter, NEWSBYTES
(Sept. 5, 1999), at http://www.newsbytes.com [hereinafter Chinese Dissident Arrested];
China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 1037-39; Chinese President Reminded 48
Journalists Jailed in His Term, THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (Oct. 22, 1999), at
http://www.freedomforum.org/international/1999/10/22preszemin.asp [hereinafter 48
Journalists].
5. See Dissident Prints Copies, supra note 4; see also 48 Journalists, supra note 4.
6. See JOHN BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA'S
ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE 114 (1997); see also SEYMOUR
TOPPING, JOURNEY BETWEEN Two CHINAS 175 (1972).
7. See STARR, supra note 6, at 229-31.
8. See Dissident Prints Copies, supra note 4; see also Chinese Dissident Arrested,
supra note 4.
9. For purposes of this Comment, the term "freedom of speech" is used to connote
both freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Additionally, the terms "journalists,"
"dissidents," "artists," and "other proponents of free speech and press" are used
synonymously.
10. See Scott E. Feir, Comment, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted
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harmonizes with the historical beliefs, rule of law, and political
ideologies of Chinese society. Furthermore, various filmmakers
and journalists, both Chinese and foreign, have had difficulty
filming in the PRC, as well as getting films or reports past the
Chinese censor.
11
Nevertheless, there are those who believe that the media and
freedom of speech, in general, never have been as uninhibited as
they are today, at least as compared to varied historical examples
of oppression.12 These arguments are also considered below.
This Comment explores the possibility of creating a functional
freedom of speech right for the Chinese people and the intricacies
involved in achieving such a right. Part II examines the role of the
media in China, considering historical Communist philosophies,
particularly that of Mao Zedong, as well as modern-day media. It
also looks at examples of censorship within the country. Next,
Part III explains the contradictions between the legal, political,
cultural, and philosophical convictions of the Chinese and Western
societies. Part IV suggests that the PRC should uphold its
constitutional promises and international commitments to permit
free speech. Hong Kong provides a good example of a
government with socialist ideologies utilizing free speech to its
advantage. Moreover, this section considers the level of possible
involvement by the international community in the PRC's
development of free speech. Finally, Part V summarizes possible
solutions to China's freedom of speech dilemma.
II. THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN COMMUNIST CHINA
Once a country governed by dynasties, China has endured
countless invasions, bloody uprisings, dictatorships, civil wars, and
shifts in power and philosophies. 13 After much confusion and
Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Ideas, 6 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 361, 361, 383-84 (1997).
11. See Joan Chen's Xiu Xiu, ASTYLE.COM: YOUR ASIAN ENTERTAINMENT
COMMUNITY, at http://astyle.com/Articles/xiuxiu.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2000); see also
48 Journalists, supra note 4; James Mottram, Film: Uncrowned King of Hong Kong; Feted
in His Own Country, Film-maker Wong Kar-Wai Is Unknown in the West. James Mottram
Wonders Why, INDEP. (LONDON), Apr. 24, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File; Jeff Dawson, Bai Ling: From the People's Army of China to the Lights of
Hollywood, EMPIRE MAG., July 1998, at 28, available at
http://www.geocities.com/Hollywood/Boulevard/8370/empire.html.
12. See STARR, supra note 6, at 229.
13. See LI UNG BING, OUTLINES OF CHINESE HISTORY 578-93 (1967) (providing
2001]
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strife over the past two centuries, the Communist regime, initially
led by Mao Zedong (Mao), 14 took control and grew to become the
largest Communist Party in the world.15 Maintaining control over
the PRC has not always been an easy task, however, and the
people have had to endure the consequences of grave mistakes
committed by the government. 16 One horrifying example was the
government's fiercely violent reaction to the demonstrations held
in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989.17 After this intense
and irrational response to calls for democracy in Beijing, nervous
commentators anticipated political doom and gloom for future
freedoms, including freedom of speech, throughout all of the PRC
and Hong Kong.1
8
Today, contrary to practice in many Western countries, the
government strictly controls the media in communist China.19
From novels to television shows, the Chinese government
influences what the public sees and hears.20 The censor is alive
and well, and carefully scrutinizes ideas expressed by artists and
writers.
21
further historical discussion regarding China's tumultuous past); see also JOHN KING
FAIRBANK, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 219, 222-23, 226, 235-36 (4th ed. 1979);
KENNETH SCOTr LATOURETTE, CHINA 80,116-22 (1964); J.A.G. ROBERTS, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF CHINA 190-207,214-16 (1999).
14. FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 276 (explaining that Mao Zedong was a founder and
leader of the Communist Party in China).
15. See id. at 276-89, 370-75, 408-10, 440, 444, 446 (contributing more comprehensive
information about Mao and others who believed in a classless society and the belief in
working selflessly for the common good of the Chinese); see also LATOURETTE, supra
note 13, at 18; STARR, supra note 6, at 4-5, 14; TOPPING, supra note 6, at 195.
16. See FAIRBANK, supra note 13, at 440; see also STARR, supra note 6, at 64;
TOPPING, supra note 6, at 194-95 (discussing additional examples of difficulties under
Communist rule in China, including the Cultural Revolution and Mao's "Great Leap
Forward" plan).
17. In the days preceding the massacre, Chinese students began to demand more
democracy, greater freedom of speech, and increased governmental representation. See
T.K. Tong, Democracy V. Autocracy: A Live Record, in DEDICATED TO FREEDOM 5
(Nina Shen et al. eds., 1989); see also May 16 Statement, in DEDICATED TO FREEDOM 10-
12 (Nina Shen et al. eds., 1989); Gao Lu-ji, My Daughter in Tiananmen Square, in
DEDICATED TO FREEDOM 12-13 (Nina Shen et al. eds., 1989); Wu'er Kaixi's Speech, in
DEDICATED TO FREEDOM 17 (Nina Shen et al. eds., 1989).
18. Richard Cullen, Media Freedom in Chinese Hong Kong, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
383,384 (1998).
19. See China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1036-37.
20. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850-51.
21. See id. at 850-52.
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A. Mao's Philosophies at Work
Mao greatly influenced Chinese philosophies regarding
various media.22 He believed that because the audience consisted
of simple, working-class people, art should be uncomplicated and
straightforward. 23 He did not think art could be appreciated on its
own, rather it had to convey a message to be effective:
According to Mao, art and literature exist to persuade and to
teach-appreciation of art for its own sake is unacceptable-
and the central ideological lesson to be conveyed is the
superiority of the worker and peasant who serve the revolution
through their labor. Art, literature, and the performing arts
should depict exemplary figures to serve as either models or
counter-models for the rest of society.
24
Mao favored works that glorified heroes and heroines, and
humiliated villains.25  He disliked "middle characters" that
complicated the message. 26 For example, Mao disfavored those
individuals in stories who "[had] doubts, good characters who
[had] flaws, and villains with redeeming features." 27
Because of Mao's instructions with respect to these ideals,
writers, artists, and composers depicted honest, hardworking
peasants who were downtrodden by tyrannical landlords.28 During
a time when the masses desired an alternative to the corrupt
Nationalist Party, artists viewed Mao and the Communists as
positive forces and often subscribed to Mao's ideals.29 Eventually,
though, after years of being limited by the government to creating
only works based on "inspirational tales from the revolution,"
diverse currents influenced China's culture.30 Western art forms
and alternative modes of expression particularly impacted the
culture. 31
22. See STARR, supra note 6, at 230.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 231,
31. See id.
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B. Modern Chinese Media
During the twentieth century, new kinds of media developed
rapidly. Along with the advent of each new medium came new
challenges for the PRC. Currently, the government primarily is
concerned with retaining control over the messages received by
the Chinese people.32 On the other hand, there is mounting
evidence that Chinese people desire the truth and want easier
access to information.3
3
Historically, the government used newspapers, television, and
radio primarily for political propaganda.34 At various times during
the 1980s and 1990s, however, increased profits, public interest in
seeking the truth about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and
a confidence in their own abilities to acquire information began to
drive the Chinese media toward autonomy.35 Additional factors
that contributed to the heightened autonomy of the media
included: economic growth; improved literacy among the people;
an increased skepticism toward authority; greater contact with the
West; waning political ideologies; better trained personnel;
weakening party controls; and access to new technologies. 36
32. See id. at 243-45.
33. See Linda Jakobson, "Lies in Ink, Truth in Blood:" The Role and Impact of the
Chinese Media During the Beijing Spring of '89, JOAN SHORENSTEIN BARONE CTR. ON
THE PRESS, POL., AND PUB. POL'Y, Aug. 1990, at 2.
34. See TODD HAZELBARTH, THE CHINESE MEDIA: MORE AUTONOMOUS AND
DIVERSE-WITHIN LIMITS vii (1997); see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at
1037 (evaluating the status of human rights in the PRC in 1999). The report demonstrates
that government involvement and control over the media have once again increased. Id.
at 1036-40. The report states:
More than in recent years, the press was exploited by the Government as an
effective propaganda tool to disseminate an official line. For example, in its
press coverage of NATO's action against Serbia, NATO was depicted as bent on
using the conflict in Kosovo as an excuse to expand its influence. Casualties
caused by NATO attacks on Serb forces received prominent coverage, but there
was almost no mention of the plight of ethnic Albanian Kosovars. The
Government's manipulation of the press to mold public opinion had violent
results when demonstrators targeted foreign diplomatic facilities in Beijing after
NATO's mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
Id. at 1037. Additionally, journalists were specifically instructed to focus on positive PRC
achievements throughout the year, and to de-emphasize the negative in preparation for
the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the PRC on October 1, 1999.
Id. Thus, the serious "nationwide crackdown against the Falun Gong spiritual
movement," and the overall poor political atmosphere greatly increased self-censorship
among journalists. Id.
35. See HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at vii.
36. See id. at 3-13.
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Consequently, the media available to the people dramatically
expanded during those two decades.
37
For example, the number of newspapers alone jumped from
forty-two in 1968 (virtually all of which were Communist Party
papers) to over 2,200 in the 1990s.38 Moreover, over 7,000
magazines and journals are currently published in the PRC.
39
Correspondingly, the greater variety of material available in recent
years (including many non-sanctioned publications) has been
accompanied by a noticeable decline in readership among the top
Communist Party newspapers featuring party speeches,
propaganda, and policy viewpoints. 40 To illustrate, readership of
the People's Daily, the Communist Party's flagship newspaper, has
decreased,41 while circulation of less inhibited magazines and
municipal newspapers, such as the Guangzhou Daily, has
dramatically increased.
42
Electronic media also has experienced changes. Talk radio in
the 1990's, for instance, "shifted the paradigm from authorities
addressing the people to people addressing the authorities." 43 To
illustrate, for many years, only a single radio station existed in
Shanghai, which solely aired pro-government propaganda. 44 In
1992, however, a second station entered the market featuring a
format that de-emphasized propaganda.45  Gradually, due to
competition between the two stations, both formats became
livelier and more popular.46
Television also has changed over the years. The PRC's only
national network, Chinese Central Television (CCTV), controls
broadcast television.47 CCTV is under the "dual supervision of the
Propaganda Department, responsible ultimately for media
content, and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television, which
oversees operations." 48 The State appoints network directors and
37. See id. at 1.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 2.
40. See id. at 8.
41. Id. at 8, 10.
42. See id. at 10.
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id.
2001]
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officers at CCTV and other local stations.49 Over the past few
decades, television has grown in popularity as increasing numbers
of television sets appear in households. 50 In fact, the number of
sets per household has doubled to nearly 300 million over the last
ten years. 51 Television stations also are increasing at a rate of
fifteen percent per year.52 Although Chinese television once
consisted mainly of official news and pedagogical documentaries,
the arrival of cable television and satellite dishes has diversified
programming. 53 As a result, effective governmental regulation of
television poses an increasing challenge. 54  Currently, "[t]he
government owns all television stations and monitors the content
of their broadcasts, but with the proliferation of stations, most of
them locally managed, the diversity of programming has increased
significantly." 5
5
To begin, cable television, with access to multiple global news
networks and other Chinese-language channels (including some
from Hong Kong), is available in many Chinese cities, and is
extremely difficult for the government to control.56  Both
legitimate and illegal cable operators offer service, and "Beijing is
unable to effectively monitor, let alone control, the illicit cable
operators who have sprung up .... 57 By 1995, "about 1,000 of the
3,000 cable stations in China, linked to perhaps fifty million homes,
were unlicensed." 58
Satellite television poses another big challenge for the CCP.
The government continues its efforts to regulate the sale and use
of satellite dishes.59 In fact, in 1993, the government expressly
banned the dishes. 60 When the ban proved ineffective, the
government tried to require the licensing of dishes in 1994.61
Eventually, in 1995, the government simply specified permissible
49. See id.
50. See STARR, supra note 6, at 243.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 1.
53. See STARR, supra note 6, at 243.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 852; see also HAZELBARTH,
supra note 34, at 11.
57. HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 11.
58. Id.
59. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 852.
60. HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 11.
61. Id.
256 [Vol. 23:249
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programs and viewing hours.62 The CCP's trouble with satellite
television primarily involves the acquisition of the dishes
themselves. 63  Although the government effectively regulates
programs received via satellite from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
elsewhere, the illegal sale of dishes creates a great nuisance for the
CCP.64  The difficulty with satellite television stems from
"government entities such as the Ministry of Machinery Industry
and the military services [that produce] dishes outside allowable
quotas and guidelines and then sell them illicitly to eager
customers." 65  In 1997, profit margins reached as much as fifty
percent per dish, which made it nearly impossible for the
government to stop the practice.
66
The growing fascination with the Internet further hampers
governmental control over the flow of information, which poses
yet another huge challenge for the CCP. Worldwide, Internet
usage is growing exponentially, 67 and industry experts estimate
that actual users in China equal approximately ten million. 68 The
Internet provides the Chinese people with access to uncensored
material, like news from the on-line service, Chinese News
Digest.69 Chinese volunteers in the United States and Australia
created and currently distribute this unrestricted news service.
70
Although there are aspects of the Internet that are difficult to
block, such as e-mail and e-mail publications,71 the Chinese
government has waged a tremendous effort to control this
medium. 72 The CCP tried to block certain sites, suspend new
Internet service provider applications, and placed existing services
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications, the Ministry of Electronics Industry, and the
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 847.
68. See id.
69. HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 12.
70. Id.
71. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 847 (reporting that dissident
groups both abroad and on the mainland disseminate information and publications, such
as the e-mail magazine called VIP Reference News, to Chinese readers via e-mail, which
provide news not covered by the official media in the PRC).
72. See HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 12.
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State Education Commission. 73 The government worries that "the
State will become totally unable to monitor Internet access at
residences" as more homes become equipped with telephone
lines. 74  Nonetheless, despite such increased difficulties, the
government persistently tries to regulate the messages available to
the Chinese people.
With technology making media more difficult to monitor and
manage, the CCP has begun to focus on regulations and directives
that make control a matter of law.75 In the late 1990s, the
government expressed its dominance by shutting down
publications, as well as by imposing fines and even by imprisoning
journalists.76 But while the government desires to control all
media in the PRC, a significant number of Chinese citizens prefer
uninhibited thought, expression, and free speech.
77
Internationally, more countries are be&coming enlightened with
regard to such fundamental individual freedoms. 78 Arguably, the
PRC also has shown an interest in providing further individual
rights.79 In the early and mid-1990s, greater media autonomy
seemed to be a distinct possibility,80 but starting in late 1998, the
CCP made a point of subduing the burgeoning media to maintain
the government's superior position over the people.
81
C. The Infamous Chinese Censor
Surprisingly, the average Chinese citizen enjoys significantly
more personal freedom today than ever before.82 A 1998 U.S.
State Department report stated that Chinese citizens benefit from
"[h]igher disposable income, looser economic controls, greater
freedom of movement, increased access to outside sources of
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. The CCP's control of the media using the rule of law is further discussed
in Parts II.C. and III.A.
76. See HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 14.
77. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850-52.
78. See Jimmy Carter, Foreword to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
ix (Paul Williams ed., 1981).
79. See XIANFA art. 35 (1982); see also China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at
839.
80. See HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at 3-13.
81. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 837.
82. See id. at 839.
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information, greater room for individual choice, and more
diversity in cultural life."
83
On the other hand, the government of the PRC continues to
infringe upon many basic human rights, such as freedom of
speech. 84 For example, in 1999, Chinese authorities "did not
hesitate to move quickly against those it perceived to be a threat to
government power or national stability. Citizens who seek to
express openly dissenting political and religious views continue to
live in an environment filled with repression."
85
Freedom of speech, as a whole, remains elusive in the PRC.
86
Still, the government tends to be particular with its restrictions.
87
In fact, although the CCP censor is somewhat lenient with various
types of artistic content, it is extremely sensitive to certain
subjects. 88 While a substantial amount of sex, violence, and lack of
morality is largely ignored, political dissent is a hot trigger for the
censor. 89 Specifically, the government "does not permit citizens to
publish or broadcast criticisms of senior leaders or opinions that
directly challenge Communist Party rule."
90
The government justifies the repression of speech
constitutionally. 91 The Chinese Constitution expressly states that
its citizens should enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the
press as fundamental rights.92  The government claims that
although this may be true, it interprets "the Communist Party's
'leading role,' as mandated in the preamble of the Constitution, as
circumscribing these rights." 93 Therefore, the government deems
its various methods of censorship appropriate.
94
The government controls the media through a complex
system of self-censorship, policies, guidelines, and direct
supervision. 95 The Propaganda Department of the Party's Central
83. Id.
84. See id. at 837-39.
85. Id. at 839.
86. See id. at 850-52.
87. See STARR, supra note 6, at 241-42.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.; see also XIANFA pmbl. (1982). For a more detailed discussion regarding
constitutional interpretation in the PRC, see Part III.A.
94. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850.
95. Jakobson, supra note 33, at 4-5; see also Jennifer Rocke, China's Violation of
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Committee oversees the daily work of checking the press.96 A
working group of the Propaganda Department also is responsible
for creating specific guidelines for journalists to follow.97 This
group meets weekly to determine the desired themes and issues on
which journalists should focus.98 Then, the working group briefs
the editors-in-chief of major national newspapers so they can pass
along the information to other journalists.
99
The Propaganda Department also manages the Ministry of
Radio, Film, and Television, which, in turn, supervises these
media.100 One journalist who worked for CCTV's English
Language News Department during the 1980s said, "Minister Ai
Zhisheng would usually personally show up at the CCTV
newsroom and preview the 7 p.m. Chinese news broadcast. He
was known by the nickname 'Director of News."' 10 1
Censorship by the government is both direct and indirect.10 2
The press is "under explicit, public orders to follow CCP
directives, and [to] 'guide public opinion' as directed by political
authorities." 10 3 Additionally, formal and informal guidelines that
require the media to avoid politically sensitive topics or refrain
from divulging state secrets create an atmosphere of self-
censorship. 1°4 The government employs
[A] wide range of controls that violate the right to free
expression and interfere with independent media. These
include severe restrictions on contact between foreign news
media and Chinese viewed by the government as critical of the
regime. An extensive censorship bureaucracy licenses all media
outlets and publishing houses and must approve all books
before publication. 10
5
Such control techniques produce shocking results. Journalists
face possible imprisonment, expulsion from the country, and loss
Human Rights and the Olympic Bid, at http://yn.1a.ca.us/olympic/student.china.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2000).
96. Jakobson, supra note 33, at 4.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850-52.
103. Id. at 850.
104. See id.
105. Rocke, supra note 95.
260 [Vol. 23:249
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of their jobs.106  Additionally, the threat persists that the
government will close media outlets, and may only reopen them
once the CCP has had a chance to work with the editors to
"correct their thinking."10 7  Moreover, the government jams
broadcasts of foreign radio and television shows it believes
interfere with internal affairs.10 8 It also bans foreign journalists
from entering the country. 10 9
Self-censorship is another significant instrument of control
that the CCP wields over the media.110 The CCP Propaganda
Department has established guidelines for Chinese journalists,
editors, and publishers in order to avoid sanctions like
imprisonment, employment termination, or demotion. 111  For
example, for journalists to avoid such penalties, "news coverage is
required to be 80% positive and 20% negative." 112  Also,
dissidents who speak out against the government, especially to
foreign media, "are often subject to threats, detention, harassment,
intensive surveillance or imprisonment," and therefore are
hesitant to voice their opinions. 113
Nevertheless, the government has shown moments of
tolerance. 114 For a brief period during the 1990s, it seemed as if
the CCP finally was beginning to realize that free speech was not
necessarily synonymous with the destruction of the PRC's
government. 115  During much of 1998, for instance, the
government allowed greater openness of the press and free
speech. 116 In an unprecedented move, 117 the government allowed
live television and radio broadcasts of a joint press conference held
by President Bill Clinton of the United States and President Jiang
of the PRC.118 The press also broadcast a speech by President
Clinton at Beijing University. 119 People even published various
106. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850-52.
107. Id. at 851.
108. Id. at 852.
109. Id.
110. See Rocke, supra note 95.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 850.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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books containing full, unedited transcripts of the press conference,
the Beijing University speech, and other remarks by Presidents
Clinton and Jiang Zemin. 120 These events "allowed citizens to
witness on television for the first time uncensored comments,
exchange, and debate on previously taboo issues such as human
rights abuses, the Tiananmen massacre, and Tibet. ' 121 During
parts of that year, the press continued to expand its coverage to
discuss such topics as corruption by Communist Party officials,
legal reforms, and citizens' rights. 122  Popular investigative
television news shows "aggressively pursued official
malfeasance." 123  Moreover, the state-run press printed
straightforward articles and conducted interviews with senior
officials who called for judicial system reform and an end to court
corruption. 124 Supposedly, this reporting often was achieved "with
the tacit consent or even open support of the Government.,
125
Eventually, however, the brush with free speech ended.126
The government reverted to its oppressive ways and it
ultimately interpreted Chinese legislation as restrictive toward
speech. 127 During the final months of 1998, the government began
to clamp down on the less constrained press activity.128 On
December 23, 1998, the Supreme People's Court interpreted a
provision of the PRC's Publications Law, holding that the law
"criminalizes under the State Security Law the 'publication,
distribution, or broadcast' of material containing content intended
to 'incite national division, damage national unity, incite
subversion of national authority, or incite the overthrow of the
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 851.
127. See id.
128. See id.; see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1039. The
oppression of dissidents in the PRC continues. See China Country Report 1999, supra note
3, at 1036-40. Beginning in 1998, the PRC government feared that an increase in
dissension would occur due to politically sensitive events and anniversaries such as the
"May 8 embassy bombing in Belgrade, the June 4 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen
massacre, and the July crackdown against the Falun Gong." Id. at 1039. The government
adopted "a policy of near-zero tolerance of dissent" in which scores of activists were
arrested, some of whom were sentenced to very long prison terms, and "almost all
dissident activity effectively was halted." Id.
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socialist system." '129  Following this decision, the government
proceeded to suppress political dissenters. 130  The authorities
quickly subdued those it perceived to threaten governmental
power or national stability.
131
D. The Chinese Censor at Work: Specific Examples of Speech
Suppressed
The Chinese censor is a force to be reckoned with for those in
the arts and media.132 Despite a great deal of evidence to the
contrary, however, the government actually has loosened its grip
on media controls in the past and usually remains forbearing with
regard to particular aesthetic qualities.133 As stated previously, the
government has been fairly lenient concerning certain creative
content.134 Furthermore, intermittently during the 1980s and
1990s,135 the government did allow the press to publish stories
critical of Communist Party officials and of Chinese society in
general, as well as to depict unfair treatment of the people by the
government. 136 Commentators have argued that compared to
other Communist countries of that time, the population seemed
well informed, and "the Chinese press seemed remarkably
vigorous and daring. Deng Xiaoping's decision to drastically
129. China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 851.
130. See id.; see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1039.
131. China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 839; see also 48 Journalists, supra
note 4 (stating that "the Paris-based Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF) issued a report
noting that during his [Chinese President Jiang Zemin's] presidency 48 Chinese journalists
have been jailed and 10 are still in prison[,]" and that "[p]olice repression against dissident
journalists has been stepped up over the past year").
132. See China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1036-41.
133. See STARR, supra note 6, at 229; see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3,
at 1039-40; discussion supra Part II.C.
134. See STARR, supra note 6, at 241-42; see also discussion supra Part II.C.
135. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 3. Jakobson discusses her move to the PRC in
1987 and the way in which she was struck by the "extraordinary degree of openness and
diversity which [she] encountered." Id. She wrote:
Newspapers published reports of party officials indicted for embezzlement and
profiteering. Letters to the editor described the unfair treatment by party
members of ordinary people. In general, many commentaries and editorials,
both in the newspapers and on television, touched upon the failings of society,
and were frank and to the point.
Id. Also, in the 1990s, the media made progress toward greater openness, and the range of
issues the press could cover expanded until late 1998. China Country Report 1998, supra
note 3, at 850.
136. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 3.
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reform the economy and open up the country to foreign trade led
to a general easing of control in all sectors of society."'137
Nevertheless, events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989,138 and the new interpretation of the Publications Law, as
mentioned above, caused the government to quickly dampen any
burgeoning media activity. 139
In spite of this ebb and flow of liberal attitude toward the
press during the past two decades, journalists never were given
complete freedom. 140 Chinese journalism students were taught
about the restraints of their trade in the PRC despite any
perceived governmental tolerance toward the press, and they were
instructed that "revealing information which might have a negative
effect on society is useless, maybe even harmful.' 141 Also, the
government reminded journalists in the PRC that in a socialist
country, the interests of the government and the people are the
same, and therefore, "the party's newspapers are the people's
newspapers.' 142 At times, journalists have grown weary with this
governmental rhetoric, as evidenced by the substantial press
participation in the call for democracy and free speech during the
Tiananmen Square incident.143 Regardless of any such underlying
disquiet among journalists, however, the government remains
persistent in its suppression of free speech. 144
137. Id. Deng Xiaoping was the leader of the CCP from 1976, after the death of Mao,
until his own death in 1997. See STARR, supra note 6, at 5, 306-07. Deng had a unique
approach to leadership. Id. at 306. He attempted to avoid assuming the most senior
positions by appointing others to these duties while guiding these potential successors
from the sidelines. Id. at 307. Deng's goal was to gradually train a successor to take his
place and continue implementing his reform program so he could quietly retire without
causing problems for the country. Id. He never found anyone he truly trusted, however,
so he ultimately remained in power until his death. Id. At that point, Jiang Zemin took
control of the CCP. Id.
138. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 11, 16,19.
139. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 851; see also China Country
Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1039.
140. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 3.
141. Id. Jakobson discusses an example in which the China School of Journalism
allowed "foreign experts" to lecture students about professional techniques. Id. The
Dean of the school, however, proceeded to give a lengthy speech about the restraints of
Chinese journalism and "the social responsibility that Chinese journalists must shoulder
despite the development of society and reform policy." Id.
142. Id. at 4.
143. See id. at 13. The press wanted to do away with censorship in order to report
factually on events. See id. at 13-14. They marched along with the students and reported
on the tragic occurrence. See id.
144. See China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1036-40.
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Today, the government of the PRC freely utilizes the press
for its own propaganda, and journalists often are required to have
their stories checked by the Propaganda Department of the Party's
Central Committee. 145  Moreover, the PRC has gained
international recognition for repressing speech by expelling
reporters from the country, arbitrarily detaining people, and
imprisoning people based on laws limiting the exercise of basic
rights. 146 Such actions have caused the U.S. State Department to
question the PRC's willingness to respect freedom of speech for
PRC citizens and non-citizens alike.147
Both Chinese and foreign journalists are at risk.148 As a
consequence of the CCP's crackdown on dissident journalists,
foreign journalists were not allowed to cover ceremonies to
commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre. 149 Also, a German reporter for Der Spiegel was
expelled from the PRC in 1998 and ordered not to return for five
years. 150 Similarly, a Japanese reporter was summarily forced to
leave the country. 151
Furthermore, the PRC still requires reporters from Hong
Kong, as well as foreign reporters, to apply for permission before
they can make reporting trips to the mainland,152 and "[t]hose who
bypass official channels-which many feel they must do to get the
stories they want-risk violating Chinese regulations.' 153  For
example, nine Hong Kong journalists covering a story in the PRC
were "kept in custody until they had written confessions saying
they were aware they had violated Chinese law by reporting,
without official permission, near Tiananmen Square."' 154 In
145. See id. at 1036-37; see also Jakobson, supra note 33, at 4.
146. UN: Special Rapporteurs on Religious Intolerance and Judicial Independence, M2
PRESSWIRE, Apr. 14, 1999, at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
147. See China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1019-21, 1036-40.
148. See 48 Journalists, supra note 4.
149. See id.
150. See U.S. Protests China's Expulsion of German Journalist, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Nov. 19, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
151. See id.
152. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L
RELATIONS, 106TH CONG, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998, VOL. I 875, 879 (J. Comm. Print 1999) (Hong Kong) [hereinafter Hong Kong
Country Report].
153. Id.
154. Arnold Zeitlin, In China, Press Freedom Ends at Hong Kong Border, THE
FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, June 23, 1999, at
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addition, a residual restriction from the days of British rule in
Hong Kong, which is still enforced, provides that "no Chinese-
language Hong Kong newspaper or broadcast station is permitted
to post a resident correspondent in Beijing or elsewhere in
China."'155 Such restrictions, incidents, and distrust merely add fuel
to the fire of self-censorship and reinforce the impression that
reporters must monitor their stories carefully.
156
Likewise, local journalists and dissidents face frightening
repercussions for their actions.157  The recent crackdown on
dissent is considered the "harshest since the one that followed the
military's crushing of 1989 pro-democracy protests."'158 Chinese
authorities have put numerous dissidents and journalists in prison
for printing pro-democracy reports, and sentenced some of them
to extensive jail terms on subversion charges, sometimes for as
long as thirteen years. 159 In 1993, one journalist, Wu Shishen of
the Hong Kong Express, received life imprisonment for giving a
foreign correspondent a copy of a speech the PRC's president was
to present to the People's Assembly a few days later.160 The Paris-
based organization, Reporters sans Frontidres (RSF), reported
that the government of the PRC had ordered the "state-run media
to 'pay particular attention to social order and political stability'
while legislation was introduced to punish 'anyone who
deliberately publishes, prints, copies or distributes material inciting
people to overthrow the government and the socialist system or to
divide the country." ' 161  Additionally, RSF claims prison
authorities dictate an especially harsh regime against the
imprisoned dissidents, which includes beatings by guards and no
visitation with family.
162
http://www.freedomforum.org/international/l999/6/23hongkong.asp.
155. Id.
156. See Hong Kong Country Report, supra note 152, at 879.
157. See Chinese Dissident Arrested, supra note 4; see also Dissident Prints Copies,
supra note 4.
158. Dissident Prints Copies, supra note 4.
159. Id.; see also Chinese Dissident Arrested, supra note 4.
160. See 48 Journalists, supra note 4.
161. Id.
162. See id.
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1. Examples of Governmental Control: Censorship of Specific
Media
The CCP keeps a close watch over all types of media, with the
Internet posing the greatest challenge. 163  Currently, Internet
service providers must register all users with the government. 164
The government also installs barriers to block access to certain
sites that it perceives to be subversive or pornographic.
165
Organizations such as RSF and the Committee to Protect
Journalists have ranked the PRC among the twenty leading
enemies of the Internet. 166  Again, imprisonment is a likely
punishment for posting information the government deems
inappropriate.1 67 In one instance in 1999, a Shanghai software
engineer, Lin Hai, was sentenced to two years in prison for
releasing the e-mail addresses of 30,000 Chinese computer users to
a banned Internet journal published by Chinese dissidents in the
United States.
168
The censor also carefully monitors film, broadcast television,
and radio. Filmmaking is a risky business in China, as some artists
have discovered. 169  The government owns the major film
studios.170 Consequently, films are screened and censored before
public release. 171 For example, while filming a movie in the PRC,
Wong Kar-Wai, director of Happy Together, faced lengthy permit
delays and censorship problems.172 The film features a gay couple
in Buenos Aires.173 The government objected to much of the
subject matter, including the title, and thus the film can never be
released in the PRC.174 Another director, Joan Chen, faced
similar difficulties while filming her movie, the award-winning Xiu
163. See Dissident Prints.Copies, supra note 4; see also HAZELBARTH, supra note 34, at
11-12; STARR, supra note 6, at 245.
164. Dissident Prints Copies, supra note 4.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Africa-at-Large: The Twenty Enemies of the Internet, AFRICA NEWS, Aug. 9,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
168. Dissident Prints Copies, supra note 4; see also Chinese Dissident Arrested, supra
note 4.
169. See STARR, supra note 6, at 239-41.
170. See id. at 241-42.
171. See id.
172. See Mottram, supra note 11.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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Xiu. 175  After waiting two months for her screenplay to be
approved, the Chinese Film Bureau proposed detrimental changes
to her script. 176 Chen decided to film without an official permit
and consequently faced the possibility of authorities expelling her
and her crew from the country.177 Furthermore, U.S. films and
talent have been prohibited from entering the PRC.178 Richard
Gere, Brad Pitt, and Martin Scorsese all have been banned from
China because of roles they have played or films they have
directed that have portrayed the Chinese government
negatively. 179 Chinese-born Bai Ling, who co-starred alongside
Richard Gere in the movie Red Corner, faces the "infinitely more
serious consequence of never seeing [her] family again."'
180
Similarly, censorship affects broadcasting industries. The
government in the PRC owns and monitors the content of all the
television and radio stations.181  As previously addressed,
regulating television has become quite difficult in recent years with
the advent of satellite dishes and cable television. 182 Chinese
viewers now have access to a plethora of foreign programming. 183
In fact, coverage by foreign news crews facilitated the
international attention given to the Tiananmen Square
massacre. 184 Foreign reporters were covering the visit of Mikhail
Gorbachev to Beijing, but the demonstrations and the subsequent
massacre captured the limelight. 185 Chinese television stations also
covered the initial demonstrations, 186 which created an interesting
and devastating twist. Prior to the massacre, and even as late as
May 29, 1989, the Beijing Radio Service broadcast a statement by
the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television stressing that Chinese
radio and television stations were the mouthpieces of the party,
the government, and the people. 187 Eventually, "[w]hen the
175. See Joan Chen's Xiu Xiu, supra note 11 (stating that the movie swept the 1998
Golden Horse Awards, which are Taiwan's Oscar equivalents).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Dawson, supra note 11, at 28.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. See STARR, supra note 6, at 243.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 243-44.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 12. On June 3, 1989, martial law troops began to
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newspapers and television started to report on the protests by the
students, without branding them troublemakers, it was interpreted
as something officially sanctioned.' 1 88 This led the Chinese people
to believe it was permissible, even safe, to support the protesting
students.189 The news reports evoked sympathy and mobilized
citizens to become involved in order to topple the hard-line
leadership. 1
90
The misunderstanding of the government's intentions and the
misplaced trust in the CCP resulted in many deaths and injuries.' 91
Immediately after the violence of Tiananmen Square subsided, the
censor regained control and increased its patrol of the media,
despite the legal and political implications.192 Nevertheless, the
close encounters with free speech continue to persist in the minds
of the Chinese, and create a sense of hope, that ultimately such
freedom might be achieved. As previously discussed, once the
uproar following Tiananmen Square diminished, the government
did seem to loosen the reins on the media for a few years during
the 1990s, even if it was just for a short time.193 Thus, the question
remains: is freedom of speech a possibility in the PRC?
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA?
CHINESE VERSUS WESTERN VIEWS
The PRC is frequently criticized for failing to provide
freedom of speech, among other fundamental freedoms, to its
citizens. 194 Those who speak out against the government often pay
a heavy price. 195 Ideally, the government of the PRC will come to
realize that freedom of speech is important to a successful and
fruitful society196 and will subsequently enforce this right. Hong
Kong, for example, flourished under British democratic influences
"force their way through the streets of Beijing towards Tiananmen Square, firing
indiscriminately at civilians." Id. at 18.
188. Id. at 14.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 11, 16,19.
193. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 839, 850-52.
194. See id. at 850.
195. See 48 Journalists, supra note 4.
196. See A. Lin Neumann, Press Freedom Under the Dragon: Can Hong Kong's Media
Still Breath Fire?, COMM. TO PROTECr JOURNALISTS, Sept. 1997, at 2-3, available at
http://www.cpj.org/pubs/regionalreports/hong-kong/.
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that included such individual rights. 197 Convincing the PRC to
create similar freedoms on the Chinese mainland, though, may be
a complicated goal. 198 Nonetheless, incorporating freedom of
speech into a socialist society is not impossible.
It is sometimes difficult for Western cultures to comprehend
the PRC's lack of interest in civil and political rights.199 It may
further understanding, however, if the societal differences that
play a crucial role in determining the existence of freedom of
speech are considered. It often seems that Westerners, "believe
not only that [their] position on these issues is correct, but that it is
the only correct position and thus should be universally
accepted. '200 For example, Westerners scorn the PRC for limiting
an individual's access to the political process or for failing to
protect people from "illegitimate interference by other individuals
or by the state." 20 1 On the other hand, the Chinese government
scoffs at the negligence of Western nations in focusing on
economic and social rights such as providing citizens with
employment, food, education, and health care.20 2  These
differences are examined in this section.
Many factors exist that could influence the potential for the
PRC to achieve some degree of free speech. Westerners must
remember that although a Chinese version of free speech may not
parallel Western ideologies exactly, some amount of free speech is
better than none.20 3 With practical changes in governmental
policy and attitude, freedom of speech may be a possibility not
subject to prohibition.
A. Political Ideologies and Legal Considerations Influence
Freedom of Speech in the PRC
The Constitution of the PRC is the ultimate ruling body of
law in all of China, including Hong Kong.20 4 It was instituted in
197. See id.
198. See R.P. Peerenboom, What's Wrong with Chinese Rights?: Toward a Theory of
Rights with Chinese Characteristics, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 57 (1993).
199. See STARR, supra note 6, at 204.
200. Id. at 197.
201. Id. at 204.
202. See id. at 204-06.
203. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 57.
204. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 387-88.
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1982.205 The Constitution provides certain fundamental freedoms
for the people, 20 6 including freedom of speech.207 Article 35 of the
Constitution provides, "citizens of the People's Republic of China
enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association,
of procession and of demonstration." 20 8 The dilemma then arises:
although the PRC has constitutional provisions in place regarding
certain freedoms, these freedoms often are not recognized in
practice. 2
09
1. Socialist Ideologies Clash with Western Notions of Freedom of
Speech
Socialist dogma dictates a non-individualistic society.210
Because the PRC is a socialist state, the rights of the individual are
generally secondary to those of the state.211 In fact, the preamble
205. XIANFA (1982).
206. See id. art. 35. Other articles provide for other fundamental rights. Id. ch. 2. For
example, Article 34 provides for the right to vote, Article 36 provides for freedom of
religion, and Article 45 provides citizens "the right to material assistance from the state
and society when they are old, ill or disabled." Id. arts. 34, 36, 45.
207. Id. art. 35.
208. Id.
209. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 29, 34, 56; see also STARR, supra note 6, at 60
(stating that the Constitution is "best understood as a mission statement or policy platform
.... It was not intended, nor does it function, as a set of fixed principles against which
specific laws and practices are measured and overturned if found to be at odds.").
210. See Peter Meyer, The International Bill: A Brief History, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS, at XXXI n.* (Paul Williams ed., 1981). Deng Xiaoping created
a system of "socialism with Chinese characteristics." STARR, supra note 6, at 79.
Communism is a subset of socialism. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 460 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY]. This Comment considers socialist ideologies in
general. Socialism is defined as "a stage of society that in Marxist theory is transitional
between capitalism and communism" and is "any of various theories or social and political
movements advocating or aiming at collective or governmental ownership and
administration of the means of production and control of the distribution of goods." Id. at
2162. Compare communism, which holds a narrower meaning. Id. at 460. Communism is
defined as:
[A] social and political doctrine or movement based upon revolutionary Marxian
socialism that interprets history as a relentless class war eventually to result
everywhere in the victory of the proletariat and the social ownership of the
means of production with relative social and economic equality for all and
ultimately to lead to a classless society.
Id.
211. See Meyer, supra note 210, at XXIX-XXXI n.* During the drafting and adoption
process of the International Bill of Human Rights, several countries, including countries
whose governments and cultures were based upon socialist and communist ideologies like
the USSR, "wanted to subordinate the individual to the state." Id. at XXXI n.*; see also
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of the Chinese Constitution212 evidences the conflict of Chinese
versus Western ideologies. The government of the PRC firmly
believes in the socialist goal of uniting workers, peasants, and
intellectuals to build a classless society.213 The preamble states:
The socialist transformation of the private ownership of the
means of production has been completed, the system of
exploitation of man by man abolished and the socialist system
established. The people's democratic dictatorship led by the
working class and based on the alliance of workers and
peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat,
has been consolidated and developed . . . . The exploiting
classes as such have been abolished in our country .... The
Chinese people must fight against those forces and elements,
both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's socialist
system and try to undermine it.2 14
Given this belief in an aggregated society, it is not surprising that
individualistic freedoms, such as speech, are frequently
suppressed.21
5
Socialist tenets directly clash with the convictions of the
United Nations and truly democratic societies.216 In clear contrast
to the PRC's beliefs, the United Nations and Western cultures
strongly believe in the rights of the individual. 217 In light of the
lessons learned from two world wars and countless acts of
terrorism, many countries banded together to create the United
Nations.2 18  The United Nations' goal is to implement
international law that protects the rights of the citizens of U.N.
member countries.219 Reconciling belief systems in order to
achieve the United Nations' goal, however, can be challenging.
For Western countries, it is a fundamental belief that "human
beings have rights, solely by virtue of being human." 220 Western
STARR, supra note 6, at 197-98.
212. See XIANFA pmbl. (1982).
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See High Commissioner M. Robinson Briefs Commission on Human Rights on
Situation of Kosovar Refugees, M2 PRESSWIRE, Apr. 12, 1999, available at LEXIS, News
Library, News Group File.
216. See STARR, supra note 6, at 197-98, 204; see also Meyer, supra note 210, at XXXI.
217. See Carter, supra note 78, at ix.
218. See Tom J. Farer, Introduction to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, at XV (Paul Williams ed., 1981)
219. See id.
220. Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 37.
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societies derive their ideas of individual rights from philosophical
traditions extending from classical Greek thought through the
European Enlightenment. 221  Entire political systems and
economies are based upon these beliefs.
222
In 1966, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR).223 The IBHR
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;224 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR); 225 and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). 226 These covenants have become the
basis for the laws of many countries worldwide. 227 For example,
the ICCPR serves as the foundation of the Basic Law of Hong
Kong and the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) in Hong Kong.
228
In 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed the covenants of
the IBHR.229 In the foreword to the IBHR he said:
[tihe covenants that I signed in 1977 are unusual in the world of
international politics and diplomacy. They say absolutely
nothing about powerful governments or military alliances or the
privileges and immunities of statesmen and high officials.
Instead, they are concerned about the rights of individual
human beings and the duties of governments to the people they
are created to serve.
230
221. STARR, supra note 6, at 198.
222. See id.
223. International Bill of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III) of 10, U.N. GAOR, at 1;
see also Carter, supra note 78, at ix. "In 1976 the General Assembly adopted the two
detailed Covenants which complete The International Bill of Human Rights; and in 1976,
after the Covenants had been ratified by a sufficient number of individual nations, the Bill
took on the force of international law." Preface to THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul Williams ed., 1981).
224. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 Ill(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at4, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
225. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
226. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
227. See Farer, supra note 218, at XVIII (noting that non-communist countries in
Europe, and the Western Hemisphere, generally "took the essential norms" of the
documents and "embodied them in regional conventions."). Additionally, they
"established systems of surveillance and enforcement," including human rights courts and
commissions that exceed the monitoring procedures of the United Nations. Id.
228. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 389.
229. Carter, supra note 78, at ix; see also Meyer, supra note 210, at XLIV.
230. Carter, supra note 78, at ix.
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Communist nations were hesitant to adopt the IBHR without
major revisions. 231 The Soviet Union "found the Declaration
defective" claiming that "'a number of articles completely ignore
the sovereign rights of democratic governments.' 232 During the
drafting of the IBHR, a Russian delegate explained, "[i]n a society
where there are no rival classes . . . there can not [sic] be any
contradiction between the government and the individual since the
government is in fact the collective individual .... Therefore the
problem of the State and the individual, in its historical sense, does
not exist. '2
33
Thus, according to socialist philosophy, the state and the
individual are already equal.234  Consequently, specifically
designated individual rights would be unnecessary because
granting rights to the state automatically creates rights for
individuals by way of the state.
235
Furthermore, abiding by such international rules transgresses
Chinese notions of sovereignty. 236  The PRC "interprets the
history of their [sic] interaction with the outside world during the
nineteenth century as a long series of painful episodes of national
humiliation in which foreign powers constantly trampled on
China's sovereignty." 237 When the PRC was officially founded in
1949, Mao marked the occasion by saying, "'[o]urs will no longer
be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood
up.' ' 238  The government of the PRC is very sensitive to
encroachments on its sovereignty. 239 The government
regards foreign comment on its handling of the civil and
political rights of its citizens as a serious infringement. The
position is not irrational: imagine the reactions of the American
government were the Chinese to make continued American
investment in joint ventures contingent on Congress's
strengthening affirmative action programs, for example.
24 °
231. See Meyer, supra note 210, at XXX-XXXI.
232. Id. (quoting the delegate from the Soviet Union).
233. Id. at XXXI n.*.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See STARR, supra note 6, at 210.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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As a member of the international community, however, the PRC
may have to find an acceptable compromise to maintain positive
foreign relations and for continued involvement in organizations
like the World Trade Organization.
241
Eventually, communist countries, including the PRC, which
joined the United Nations in 1945,242 did sign the ICCPR.243 The
PRC, however, has not ratified the covenant.244 The concern
persists that although the PRC includes provisions for freedom of
speech in its constitution, the Chinese government will not abide
by its promise to provide such freedoms because of its unwavering
ideologies.245  In addition, several other legal factors affect
freedom of speech in the PRC.
2. Legal Considerations Affecting Chinese Freedom of Speech:
The Rule of Law, the Judiciary, and the Hesitation to Litigate
Another barrier to achieving freedom of speech in the PRC,
according to a Western definition of this right, involves the
Chinese view of the rule of law.24 6 The government of the PRC
controls the rule of law, and thus "prevents the development of a
genuinely independent judiciary, and renders meaningless the
concept of constitutional review." 247 For instance, Article 5 of the
Constitution states that the government is supposed to follow the
law,248 but due to socialist ideologies, the government is the law.249
241. Id. at 300; see also Madeleine K. Albright (Secretary of State) & Harold Hongju
Koh (Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), Press Briefing on the
Release of Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1999 (Feb. 25, 2000), available at
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000225.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2000)
[hereinafter Albright Press Briefing].
242. UNITED NATIONS, List of Member States, at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2000) [hereinafter
List of Member States].
243. China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 838. The PRC signed the ICCPR in
October 1998. Id.
244. Id.; see also UNITED NATIONS, The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Status of Ratifications, at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/meju3/b/a-ccpr.htm (last
modified Jan. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Status of Ratifications].
245. See Frances H. Foster, The Illusory Promise: Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong,
China, 73 IND. L.J. 765,767-68 (1998).
246. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 32-33.
247. Id.
248. XIANFA art. 5 (1982).
249. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 33. The author quotes Mao's observation
that the law and courts are "instruments with which one class oppresses another. As far as
the hostile classes are concerned these are instruments of oppression. They are violent
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In order for individual freedom of speech to become a practical
reality, an independent rule of law is necessary.250 As it currently
stands, however, the law is "a tool of socialism" and "must serve
the Party rather than individuals." 2
51
Presently, the Supreme People's Court does not possess the
power to influence freedom of speech in one way or another,252
which further degrades this right for the people. The judiciary of
the PRC is merely:
considered an organ of government subordinate to the
legislature .... Its decisions do not carry the weight of stare
decisis. The authority to interpret the Constitution and statutes,
and to annul unconstitutional administrative regulations, are
vested in the Standing Committee of the NPC [National
People's Congress], not in the Supreme People's Court.253
In order to justify the outcome of cases challenging the
constitutionality of laws, the court generally defers to legislative or
administrative authority.254 Additionally, any published opinions
do not include concurring or dissenting opinions, philosophical
discussions, or considerations of policy that could provide
significant sources of dialogue for scholars as well as the public.255
Also, trials "have essentially been closed to public scrutiny, with
only outcomes revealed, if any information at all." 256
The lack of judicial strength to question legislative decisions
facilitates the abuse of power by the government. 257 The judiciary
serves as a simple rubber stamp and fails to provide a valid check
on legislative or governmental behavior pertaining to free speech
or any other civil right. 258 Public unawareness regarding the
details of individual cases259 eliminates another check on the
and certainly not 'benevolent things."' Id.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. See Hilary K. Josephs, The Chinese Democracy Movement in US. Perspective, 10
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 285,322 (1992).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 322-23.
255. See id. at 323.
256. Id.
257. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35; see also China Country Report 1999, supra
note 3, at 1018, 1028; China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 843-44 (reporting that
"[c]orruption and conflicts of interest ... affect judicial decisionmaking.").
258. See Josephs, supra note 252, at 323.
259. See id.
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government by preventing the people from analyzing
constitutional challenges or cases concerning freedom of speech.
260
This undoubtedly inspires apathy among the people by creating
the illusion that there are no problems with the current system.261
The Chinese people are provided only with the outcomes of
cases.262  Thus, details surrounding the cases, or information
regarding the ways in which the parties violated particular rules,
are unavailable to the public.263 The average Chinese citizen
cannot actively analyze the government's adjudicative actions
because the current judicial system does not provide citizens with
access to enough information to effectively evaluate the validity of
constitutional challenges or their resolutions.
264
Furthermore, the PRC employs Article 51 of the Constitution
to justify abuse of individual rights by the state.265 Unlike a
democratic government, within a socialist state, such as the PRC,
the interests of the state equal or even trump the interests of the
individual.266 Because an individual's rights are equal to those of
the state, an exercise of those rights necessarily infringes upon the
interests of the state.
267
260. See id.
261. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35.
262. See Josephs, supra note 252, at 323.
263. See id. The author elaborates further on this point, stating:
How words or actions of defendants violated the prohibition against
counterrevolutionary offenses is not publicized. The Chinese government will
not allow the outer limits of regulation to be tested and explored at public trials.
If it did, the courts would be compelled to examine whether the law on
counterrevolutionary incitement was fair and not unacceptably vague.
Unfortunately, the courts in China have acquiesced in this erosion of due
process guarantees.
Id.
264. See id.; see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1020-21 (explaining
that the Chinese government is making efforts to "reform the legal system and to
disseminate information about new legislation."). The PRC has created initiatives to
"improve the transparency and accountability of the judicial and legal systems" and is
attempting to better "educate lawyers, judges, prosecutors and the public" regarding new
laws, particularly those that could enhance citizens' rights, including due process rights.
Id. The enforcement of the new laws is poor, however, especially regarding the Criminal
Procedure Law, "and the law routinely is violated in the cases of political dissidents." Id.
265. Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 33; see also XIANFA art. 51 (1982) (stating that
"[c]itizens of the People's Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may
not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the
lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.").
266. See Meyer, supra note 210, at XXXI n.*.
267. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 33.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
If an individual challenges the PRC's suppression of his or her
right to free speech, there is little, if any, true recourse available.268
The PRC has no independent agency, akin to the U.S. judiciary, to
review its laws.269 Essentially, genuine constitutional review does
not exist.270 In fact, according to the PRC's Constitution, the
''power to interpret and enforce the constitution" does not belong
to the PRC's judiciary or another independent agency, but rather
belongs to the National People's Congress (NPC).271 Because the
NPC drafts and adopts the laws, however, "[i]t seems unlikely that
the standing committee would interpret any statute or amendment
as inconsistent with the constitution or the basic principles of the
statutes." 272 The bottom line is that a genuine right to freedom of
speech requires an independent body with the power to review
laws that may abuse this right.
273
The government of the PRC takes the primacy of the party
idea to an extreme, yet party control should be limited. While it is
true that freedoms in any country, including the United States, are
not completely boundless, at least individual rights exist. 274 For
example, in the United States, legislation can override individual
rights in certain circumstances, but significant rights endure. 275
Additionally, in Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the United Nations provides a boundary on the limitations
imposed against an individual's rights and freedoms when it is in
the public's best interest.276 Conversely, the CCP's control over
268. See id. at 34.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 31 n.9.
275. See id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that
incitement to violence is unprotected speech as long as there is a danger of imminent
unlawful action); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (explaining that the
act of burning a draft card in a public place is unprotected speech); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (finding constitutional a state statute prohibiting
unlicensed parades or processions).
276. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 224, at 9. Article 29(2)
states:
[1]n the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
[Vol. 23:249
2001] Freedom of Speech in China 279
free speech is oppressive. Rather than endeavor to provide rights
with practicable limitations, it merely forbids certain speech
altogether.
277
The apathetic attitude of the citizenry in the PRC toward the
rule of law further promotes the government's ability to dictate
their actions. 278 In addition to the aforementioned hindrances to
freedom of speech, the Chinese are generally hesitant to litigate.
279
Instead, arbitration is the preferred method because according to
Chinese tradition, litigation is shameful, risky, and a waste of time
and money.280 Also, arbitration enables the parties to "save
face," 281 which is very important in Chinese culture, 282 as well as
enjoy full participation in the proceedings. 283  Without legal
challenges made by the people regarding the abuse of their rights,
the overall development of an essential rights attitude and
sentiment wanes. 284 In addition to differing political and legal
ideologies, the PRC will find it difficult to implement freedom of
speech, as Western cultures understand it, because of cultural and
philosophical differences.
285
Id.; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, supra note 226, at
28 (stating that freedom of expression carries special duties and responsibilities, and
therefore may be subject to certain restrictions to protect the rights or reputations of
others as well as to protect national security, public order, public health, or morals).
277. See China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1036-40.
278. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35.
279. See id. at 36.
280. See id. at 36, 54-55 (stating that "[c]onflicts were to be resolved through informal,
extrajudicial means such as mediation spearheaded by a local elder.").
281. The phrase "save face" will be used hereinafter to reference the desire of the
Chinese people, government, or society to avoid humiliation accompanying the public
display inherent in litigating disputes. To "save face" means to maintain dignity, prestige,
or standing in the eyes of others. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 354
(Fernando de Mello Vianna ed., 1981). Saving face is frequently a "major consideration in
diplomatic negotiations." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, supra note 210, at 811. John Bryan
Starr comments, "it is unquestionably true that finding oneself shamed in public-losing
face-is for a Chinese person an experience to be avoided if at all possible." STARR,
supra note 6, at 76.
282. See STARR, supra note 6, at 76.
283. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 54-55.
284. Id. at 35, 36 n.30.
285. See id. at 36-38.
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B. Cultural and Philosophical Distinctions Influence the PRC's
Definition of Freedom of Speech
One encumbrance to achieving a Western-type of freedom of
speech in the PRC is the government's firm belief in
Confucianism, which "rejects the assumption that individuals are
entitled to certain inalienable rights from birth, ' 286 as Western
societies presume. 287 Rather than believing that the state should
protect such fundamental human rights as freedom of speech, the
PRC's leaders "hold that rights flow from the state in the form of a
gratuitous grant that can be subjected to conditions or abrogation
by the unilateral decision of the state." 288 Confucianism teaches
that an individual "must earn rights by achieving some minimal
level of personhood, '' 289  and "requires demonstration of
credentials as a participating member of society."290  This
hierarchical philosophy leads to a belief that unless an individual
has attained a certain status in society, he or she is powerless to
insist upon or even possess the right to particular freedoms. 291
Such feelings of ineffectiveness promote indifference among the
people.29
2
An additional cultural impediment to freedom of speech is a
lack of rights consciousness. 293 Although in recent years there
have been increasing incidents of protests, uprisings, and
dissension, the PRC government continues to vigorously crack
down on dissidents.294 The government warned the news media to
halt public discussions about political reform because it was afraid
such dialogue would promote instability in the PRC.295 Regardless
286. Id. at 40. "Chinese leaders and intellectuals never developed a strong theory of
rights to protect the individual against the dominant interests of the majority and state."
Id.
287. See id. at 41 n.58.
288. R. Randle Edwards, Civil and Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law
Today, in HUMAN RIGHTs IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 44-45 (R. Randle Edwards et al.
eds., 1986).
289. Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 40-41.
290. Id. at 41.
291. See STARR, supra note 6, at 127; see also Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 40-41.
292. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35.
293. See id.
294. See id. at 35 n.30; see also Arnold Zeitlin, China Crackdown on Dissidents Tests
Hong Kong Press Rights, THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE, Dec. 28, 1998, at
http://www.freedomforum.org/international1998/12/28crackdown.asp. Tiananmen Square
and the speaking out of dissidents are examples of recent incidents of insurrection. Id.
295. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35 n.30.
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of any clandestine desires of the Chinese people to demand
greater rights, fears of repercussions by the government, feelings
of powerlessness, and the aforementioned hesitation to litigate
have created an overall atmosphere of apathy.296 Generally, the
Chinese people are not sufficiently standing up for their right to
freedom of speech to make a difference in governmental policy.297
They are not adequately demanding constitutional review or a
more powerful judiciary.
298
In sum, the cultural and philosophical differences, combined
with the vastly different political ideologies and legal approaches,
create a great gulf in understanding between Chinese and Western
societies, and make individual freedoms difficult to achieve.299
Furthermore, until the people actively fight for their rights, the
government will disregard its constitutional promise to protect
freedom of speech.300  If these changes are made, however,
freedom of speech can become a reality.
IV. FREEDOMS WORTH ACQUIRING REQUIRE INCENTIVE AND A
WILLINGNESS TO CHANGE
As discussed above, signs of censorship remain prevalent
throughout the PRC.30 1 Ironically, the PRC has only to look to
the internal mechanisms already conveniently in place in order to
implement sweeping changes that would easily eliminate
censorship and incorporate freedom of speech. 30 2 For example,
the PRC's newly re-acquired region of Hong Kong provides a
model of the benefits of free speech, as well as a potentially
workable system of government, that incorporates both socialist
philosophies and western ideas of an independent judiciary and
free speech. Although these notions are difficult to reconcile (and
such reconciliation would be better addressed in a separate
writing), the situation in Hong Kong proves that allowing certain
freedoms is extremely advantageous. Additionally, the
296. See id. at 35-36.
297. See id. at 35.
298. See id.
299. See STARR, supra note 6, at 197-98.
300. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 35-36.
301. See supra Part II.B-D.; see also China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1036-
40.
302. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 55-56; see also supra Part III.A-B.; infra Part
IV.A.2.
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determination of whether the international community should take
on a greater role in urging the PRC to use its internal mechanisms
to achieve free speech must be addressed. Also, if international
involvement is a reasonable option, then the international
community must determine the appropriate type of pressure to
apply.
A. Options to Resolve a Persistent Problem
Although a Chinese version of free speech may never live up
to Western standards, some degree of free speech is necessary to
prevent punishment of the media for its actions. The PRC has all
the necessary provisions in place. As stated above, Article 35 of
the Constitution of the PRC expressly provides for freedom of
speech. 30 3 Moreover, the PRC has already signed the ICCPR that
calls for free speech.30 4 Now, all the government has to do is abide
by its own rules. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
of the PRC (HKSAR) may provide a glimpse of a system that
embodies Chinese ideals, but that utilizes its rule of law in such a
way that makes freedom of speech feasible.
1. Freedom of Speech Under the Basic Law of Hong Kong as a
Model for the PRC
Hong Kong is a quintessential Chinese society with a unique
hybrid mix of socialist and democratic ideals.30 5 Until the Treaty
of Nanjing was signed in 1842, and a ninety-nine year lease was
signed in 1898 granting the British control over the area, Hong
303. See XIANFA art. 35 (1982).
304. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 838; see also The International
Bill of Human Rights, supra note 223, at 28. Article 19 of the ICCPR states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public),
or of public health or morals.
Id.
305. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 404; see also infra Part IV.A.1.
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Kong consisted of barren land and fishing villages under Chinese
rule and influence. 30 6 Although it never became a democracy,
30 7
Hong Kong blossomed into a flourishing metropolis due to the
freedoms granted by the British.30 8 Hong Kong "does not now
enjoy, nor has it ever enjoyed, full democratic-representative
government. ' 30 9  Nevertheless, it is clear that "[d]espite this
shortcoming, Hong Kong has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy,
social, economic and political freedom the equal of or better than
that enjoyed in many near neighbors which have had democratic-
representative government sometimes for decades."
310
Today, the area is a thriving center of international trade and
finance. 311 From a business standpoint, Hong Kong has relied on a
"continual supply of accurate, uncensored economic information"
to become a major financial player in the global marketplace.
312
There is an inextricable relationship between the economic market
and the free flow of information that Hong Kong possessed, at
least prior to its recent handover to the PRC.313
Hong Kong has enjoyed a vibrant media with the world's
highest per capita concentration of newspapers; two broadcast
television stations; satellite, interactive, and cable TV; the Internet;
and multiple radio broadcasters. 314  Historically, freedom of
speech was not as regulated as it is in the PRC, and reporters are
still not required to have licenses.315  Hong Kong attracts
filmmakers, electronic media, and regional media because it is a
306. See STEVE SHIPP, HONG KONG, CHINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH
CROWN COLONY'S TRANSFER TO CHINESE RULE 7, 9 (1995); see also STARR, supra note
6, at 246-47.
307. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 385.
308. See Neumann, supra note 196, at 2-3.
309. Cullen, supra note 18, at 385, 399, 404. The author points out that Hong Kong is
"an overwhelmingly Chinese society. Chinese values, not surprisingly, dominate. Indeed,
in many ways, Hong Kong retains more tradition.., than the PRC Mainland." Id. at 404.
Also, as is typical within a socialist ideology, when courts must balance societal interests
versus individual interests, there is greater concern for the societal interests. Id. at 399-
401.
310. Id.at385.
311. See Neumann, supra note 196, at 3.
312. Id.
313. Id. There are persistent fears that as time progresses after the handover, the
HKSAR will lose access to this valuable information and its premier financial position. Id.
at 2.
314. Cullen, supra note 18, at 391.
315. See id.
20011
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perfect location for "China watching." 316 Additionally, the area
has high quality communication links to support a strong
infrastructure. 317 Overall, the Hong Kong press is represented as
"the only Chinese language press . . . that could justifiably be
described as free." 318
The citizens of the area realize freedom of speech is critical
because Hong Kong's
robust economy flourished in a climate of free expression that
allowed for the rapid exchange of information necessary for the
smooth functioning of the regional economy. Investors will still
need Hong Kong's free press if they are to understand the
dynamics of the changes that are underway in China and the
rest of Asia. 319
The mainland also understands the great importance of Hong
Kong to its economy as a gateway to foreign exchange. 320
Nevertheless, with regard to the repercussions of the infamous
July 1997 handover of power from Great Britain to the PRC,
concerns exist on the economy, on the now familiar freedoms in
the region, and on the PRC generally.321
316. Id. at 392. Hong Kong's location creates an ideal situation for journalists from all
over the world to freely congregate and to easily access all of East Asia and beyond. Id.
"Within six hours flying time from Hong Kong lives fifty-percent of the world's
population." Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Neumann, supra note 196, at 3.
320. See STARR, supra note 6, at 249.
321. See STARR, supra note 6, at 246, 253, 261. "Two factors have made Hong Kong
the successful financial center it is: the free flow of information and a careful adherence to
the rule of law. Because neither of these is a characteristic of the People's Republic of
China, both are in jeopardy." Id. at 261. The attitude of the government of the PRC
about Hong Kong and its fairly democratic disposition historically has wavered. Id. at
252-53. For example, preceding the handover, the government's viewpoint was influenced
by such factors as the Tiananmen Square massacre. Id. Starr said pro-democracy political
groups evolved into formal political parties after the massacre, and Chinese authorities
saw Hong Kong as "a hotbed of pro-democratic dissent and a potential threat to their own
stability." Id. Furthermore, the author comments not only on the impact of the handover
on the PRC and Hong Kong, but also on Taiwan:
How the Chinese government handles the aftermath of the transfer of
sovereignty in Hong Kong is a matter of great moment. This vibrant financial
center, which supplies nearly two-thirds of China's foreign direct investment,
could become a stagnant urban backwater. Also, effectively administering Hong
Kong would demonstrate to the people of Taiwan the viability of the "one
country, two systems" formula under which China proposes eventually to
reunify with its renegade province, while a failure to maintain Hong Kong's
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The PRC and Great Britain created the Basic Law of Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China (Basic Law) 322 to function within a "One Country-Two
Systems" approach to the handover. 323 This system allows Hong
Kong to continue its own economic, political, and social
systems,324 as well as guarantees civil liberties, for at least another
fifty years.325 The transition has not always been smooth and the
Basic Law has been subject to some controversy. 326 Nonetheless,
it provides at least some fundamental protection to individual
rights, including the freedom of speech.
327
The Basic Law, which is the HKSAR's quasi-Constitution, 328
directly incorporates provisions of the ICCPR.329 It is considered
a quasi-Constitution because "[a]s a part of the PRC, the HKSAR,
ultimately, is subject to the PRC Constitution of 1982, but the
Basic Law is meant to be the dominant constitutional instrument
in the HKSAR. '' 330 Even under Chinese sovereignty, various
sections of the Basic Law provide the framework for freedom of
speech for the residents of the region. 331 These Basic Law sections
are as follows: Article 27 guarantees that "residents shall have
freedom of speech, of the press and of publication[;],, 332 Article 85
provides that the courts of the HKSAR "shall exercise judicial
political, economic, and social systems intact will confirm the expectations of
many skeptics on Taiwan.
Id. at 246; see also SHIPP, supra note 306, at 81-83; Neumann, supra note 196, at 2-3.
322. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, adopted Apr. 4, 1990,29 I.L.M. 1511 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
323. Cullen, supra note 18, at 387-88.
324. See STARR, supra note 6, at 246.
325. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 387-89.
326. See SHIPP, supra note 306, at 81-83 (discussing the somewhat rocky transition);
see also Cullen, supra note 18, at 389. The author states that the Bill of Rights Ordinance
(BORO), which was adopted on June 8, 1991 in response to the Tianamen Square tragedy,
also was subject to much controversy. See id. Similar to the Basic Law, the BORO uses
the ICCPR as a base source of provisions, and many of the same clauses are precisely
incorporated from the ICCPR into both the BORO and the Basic Law. Id.
327. See Basic Law, art. 27, supra note 322, at 1525.
328. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 388.
329. Id. at 387, 389; see also Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, art. 16, 30 I.L.M.
1310, 1317 (1991) (stating that article 16 of the BORO guarantees freedom of opinion and
expression, and utilizes the exact language as article 19 of the ICCPR, as does the Basic
Law).
330. Cullen, supra note 18, at 387-88.
331. See id. at 398.
332. Basic Law, art. 27, supra note 322, at 1525.
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power independently, free from any interference[;], 3 33 Article 2
"provides . . . that the HKSAR is to enjoy a 'high degree of
autonomy[;]' 334 Article 8 secures the continuation of Hong
Kong's legal system;335 and Article 39 states that the provisions of
the ICCPR "shall remain in force." 336 Currently, the PRC widely
recognizes and accepts the Basic Law.337 Still, however, it is
subject to great scrutiny and criticism. 338
Most of the vitriol regarding the Basic Law stems from its
failure to guarantee a full representative democracy. 339 After
extensive negotiations prior to the 1997 handover, the PRC and
the leaders of Hong Kong fell short of adopting a fully
representative system that was acceptable to both sides.340 In
1991, the people of Hong Kong did select the first popularly
elected members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO). 341 Unlike
a completely representative democracy, however, two-thirds of the
LEGCO, which is a similar legislative body to the U.S. Congress,
were appointed by the Governor of Hong Kong, or were elected
from a pool of "mostly professional 'functional constituencies. '342
333. Id. art. 85, at 1534.
334. Id. art. 2, at 1521. Article 2 states that "[t]he National People's Congress
authorizes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree of
autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law." Id.
335. See id. art. 8, at 1521. Article 8 states that "[t]he laws previously in force in Hong
Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinance, subordinate legislation and
customary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this Law, and subject to
any amendment by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Id.;
see also Cullen, supra note 18, at 388 (stating that to maintain autonomy as a region, it is
important for Hong Kong to continue their legal system as guaranteed in Article 8 of the
Basic Law).
336. Basic Law, art. 39, supra note 322, at 1526; see also Neumann, supra note 196, at 8.
The author states that as a practical matter, however, it remains to be seen how the
government of the PRC will adhere to these laws. Id. at 7-8. Furthermore, the
relationship of three of these articles has not yet been clarified. Id. at 8. For example,
Article 23 of the Basic Law may possibly provide an escape for the PRC. Id. It appears to
contradict Articles 27 and 39 by "[instructing] Hong Kong to pass laws prohibiting
'treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft
of state secrets."' Id.; see also Cullen, supra note 18, at 398 (stating that "there is also a
serious question as to the compatibility of Article 23 with Articles 27 and 39 of the Basic
Law....").
337. See SHIPP, supra note 306, at 83.
338. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 388-89.
339. Id. at 388.
340. See id. at 389-91.
341. Id. at 389.
342. Id.
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Additionally, the Head of Government in Hong Kong, who is
similar to the U.S. President, is appointed. 343 Subsequent attempts
to increase voting rights and enable greater democracy created
tension and animosity between the Hong Kong and PRC
governments. 344 Although it is argued that Chapter 3 of the Basic
Law grants "wide-ranging guarantees of individual rights," this
fundamental weakness exists regarding total democratization and
its direct link to implementing these rights.
345
Conversely, "[t]wo of the key safeguards" of the HKSAR's
"remarkable mix of commercial and political freedom are the
independent judiciary and freedom of the press" as granted by
Articles 27, 8, and 85.346 The judiciary in the HKSAR steadfastly
continues to maintain its independence even after the handover.3
47
This permits the judiciary to counteract its tendency toward
deference to the legislative and executive branches (similar to the
deference found on the PRC's mainland) ."to ensure that these
safeguards are not undermined. '348 Despite a comparative lack of
activism by the judiciary, especially compared to some Western
court systems, litigation advocating certain rights, and regarding
the Bill of Rights Ordinance, vigorously persists.349
In essence, the HKSAR judiciary "has a Common Law
system with local characteristics." 350 It is widely influenced by
Chinese cultural customs and values, but maintains its
independence to review legal conflicts. 351 The PRC could adopt a
similar approach to its own system. It could preserve basic cultural
and political attitudes, but revise its legal system to allow for an
independent judiciary (or at least a system of arbitration) to
review individual rights conflicts, including those concerning
freedom of speech. The PRC could ratify the ICCPR provisions
similar to those articles adopted into the Basic Law and include
343. Id.
344. See id. at 390-91.
345. Id. at 388.
346. Id. at 416; see also Basic Law, arts. 8, 27, 85, supra note 322, at 1521, 1525, 1534.
347. See Cullen, supra note 18, at 416.
348. Id. at 401, 416. The author expresses concern that although the judiciary is
independent, it does have the tendency to be deferential to these branches and to be
hesitant toward judicial activism due to societal influences and cultural attitudes. Id. at
416.
349. Id. at 400.
350. Id. at 401.
351. Id. at 402.
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them into its own system of laws. Although this would require that
the PRC embrace some democratic ideals regarding certain
individual freedoms and separation of powers, it would likely
result in great benefits to the economy and the overall morale of
the people, just as in the HKSAR. Convincing the PRC to take
such action may not be such an easy task, however.
2. International Involvement to Force the PRC to Abide by Its
Own Provisions
Achieving freedom of speech in the PRC may necessitate
active participation by the international community. The PRC has
made a commitment to the international community-first, when
it joined the United Nations in 1945,352 and then again when it
signed the ICCPR in 1998 353 -regardless of the PRC's lack of
recognition of inherent fundamental rights.354 Although it has not
yet ratified the ICCPR,355 by signing it, the government has taken
the first step toward adopting a freer system. Now it needs to take
the next steps and ratify the ICCPR, incorporate the ICCPR's
principles into the PRC's own set of laws, recognize an
independent judiciary to review those laws, and acknowledge the
articles in its own constitution. Nevertheless, the government still
hesitates to make these essential strides.
Involvement by the international community is important to
encourage the PRC to enable free speech by utilizing the tools so
readily available. Because all nations are integral parts of an
increasingly global society, it is imperative that nations try to
overcome differences as well as understand and appreciate diverse
cultures to effectively work together.
352. List of Member States, supra note 242.
353. Status of Ratifications, supra note 244.
354. See The International Bill of Human Rights, supra note 223, at 21. The Preamble
to the ICCPR states:
In accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United
Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world .... that these rights derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person, .... that ... the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear
and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and
cultural rights ......
Id.
355. See China Country Report 1998, supra note 3, at 838.
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Inspiring major reforms in a nation requires serious
incentives.356 The United States has taken the position that
increased relations with the PRC, as opposed to isolating the
country via trade sanctions, would better facilitate opportunities to
engage the nation.357 For example, former U.S. President Bill
Clinton maintained that renewal of China's "Most Favored
Nation" trading status (now known as "Normal Trade Relations"
(NTR)) 358 would allow the United States "the best opportunity to
lay the basis for long-term sustainable progress in human rights
and for the advancement of our other interests with China."
359
Additionally, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright said in a press briefing:
[T]he administration has negotiated an agreement with Beijing
on China's accession to the WTO [(World Trade
Organization)]. That agreement will benefit both countries
economically, but it will also require China to follow
international trading rules, open its regulations to public
scrutiny, and reduce the role of state-owned enterprises. This
should expand the rule of law and hasten the development of a
more open society. The human rights situation in China will
not be transformed overnight, but joining the WTO will add to
the pressures welling up from within China for greater personal
and political freedom. 3 0
356. See President Clinton, U.S. Renews Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China:
Summary of Secretary's Report, Opening Statement at a News Conference, Washington,
D.C., (May 26, 1994), in 5 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 345, 345 (1994) [hereinafter
President Clinton Summary].
357. See id.
358. MSNBC, Between Two Giants: Disputes in the U.S.-China Relationship, at
http://www.msnbc.com/modules/chinadisputes/data/data_toc.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2000) [hereinafter Between Two Giants].
359. President Clinton Summary, supra note 356, at 345. Believing that engagement is
the best alternative, President Clinton promoted, among other things, increased
broadcasts for Radio Free Asia and the Voice of America, greater support for non-
governmental human rights organizations in China, and "a voluntary set of principles for
business activity in China." Id. He stated:
I believe the course I have chosen gives us the best chance of success on
all fronts. We will have more contacts. We will have more trade. We will
have more international cooperation. We will have more intense and
constant dialogue on human rights issues. We will have that in an
atmosphere which gives us the chance to see China evolve as a responsible
power, ever-growing not only economically but growing in political
maturity so that human rights can be observed.
Id.
360. Albright Press Briefing, supra note 241. While addressing the press, Harold
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The continuous problems with the PRC, however, may render
the avoidance of sanctions less palatable for the international
community. Especially in light of the PRC's continually poor
human rights record,361 recent dissident crackdown,362 "allegations
of nuclear spying by Chinese scientists, campaign contribution
scandals and massive trade surplus," avoiding sanctions is
somewhat controversial. 363 The current NTR status with the
United States remains elusive.364 Critics of the present NTR
policy suggest that the United States deny normal trade relations
in response to the PRC's poor human rights record.365 The United
States is no stranger to imposing trade sanctions against the
PRC-it has limited trade with the PRC in the past.366 In fact, the
sanctions against the PRC in protest of Beijing's 1989 violent
reaction against protesters in Tiananmen Square still remain in
force today. 3
67
If implemented, sanctions must be used wisely, however, in
order to motivate the PRC to utilize its laws and judicial system to
develop free speech and greater human rights (or depending on
one's perspective, to punish the PRC for making little progress in
Hongju Koh (Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor) made the
following remarks about China and Cuba:
[W]e adopt what we call an inside-outside approach. Which is: On the
one hand, we try to use tools of engagement to push them toward
principle and, on the other hand, we try to use instruments of external
examination to try to bring their conduct under closer scrutiny .... The
critical point, it seems to me, is that we try to bring these countries into
the international system, try to get them to play by international rules and
try to engage with them on matters of principle. In both private and
public conversations, we tell the truth, and we try to use those mechanisms
that are available to focus the spotlight and to bring pressure in a variety
of areas.
Id.
361. China Country Report 1999, supra note 3, at 1019.
362. Id. at 1039.
363. Between Two Giants, supra note 358. The report states that "permanent
extension of the NTR status, which would mute the annual crisis in relations," continues to
be a debatable issue for the U.S. government. Id.
364. Id.
365. See Albright Press Briefing, supra note 241.
366. See Between Two Giants, supra note 358.
367. Id. The U.S. Tiananmen Square sanctions prohibit "sales of military equipment
and weapons; export of U.S. satellites (subject to presidential waiver); loans from the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation; assistance from U.S. Trade Development
Agency; export licenses for crime control and detection equipment to China; and
liberalization of export controls on technology." Id.
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these areas). 368  Historically, unilateral sanctions have been
unsuccessful and:
[I]n the majority of cases they fail to change the conduct of the
targeted country or, at best, are a contributory but probably not
a decisive factor in securing the changes of behavior or policy
that we seek. Sanctions take time to work. They may exact
significant costs on other U.S. interests. So sanctions are not a
panacea, they are not a "quick fix," and they are not cost-
free .369
If used incorrectly, sanctions can impede the attainment of the
desired goal and undermine policy objectives.370 The sanctioning
country (in this case, the United States) must ensure that limiting
trade will be effective and bring about the desired results, as
opposed to inflicting hardships upon its own businesses and
farms.371  If limitations are ineffective, the imposing country
merely looks powerless and foolish, and any value to sanctions as a
foreign policy tool is diminished.
372
Generally, it is preferable "to aggressively pursue all available
diplomatic options" first.373 If those prove inadequate or fail, then
broad, multilateral sanctions are most effective. 374  These
''maximize international pressure on the offending state" by
showing a unified purpose while minimizing the overall burden
upon a single nation.375 Multilateral sanctions are also more
difficult to evade or undermine than unilateral sanctions.
376
Additionally, "the power of positive inducement is often more
productive in achieving our goals." 377 Although it might be a time-
consuming task, assisting countries in the transition to an
increasingly democratic system enables constant monitoring and
scrutiny of progress.378 Nevertheless, convincing the PRC to allow
368. See Proceedings of the Senate Task Force on Econ. Sanctions, 105th Cong. 14
(Sept. 8, 1998) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of State for Econ., Bus. and
Agric. Affairs, Dept. of State).
369. Id. at 20.
370. Id.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. Id. at 21.
374. Id. at 22.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See President Clinton Summary, supra note 356, at 345.
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free speech has been and may continue to be a frustrating process
because its belief system is strong and the government is notorious
for reacting abrasively to dissent.
As demonstrated throughout this Comment, in some respects
it seems like the tides are finally turning and the PRC is beginning
to understand the feasibility of having some form of freedom of
speech alongside a socialist ideology. Yet, in direct contradiction,
recurring examples illustrate that the government still reverts to its
archaic belief that ruling the country requires suppressing the
people. 379  The government of the PRC must realize that
oppression breeds resentment and distrust that eventually causes
upheaval, while freedom generates a sense of self and purpose
among individuals and brings about contentment.
The government of the PRC justifiably boasts about the
country's economic and social achievements (although problems
exist on these fronts as well). 380 Such achievements constitute a
good beginning. Until the PRC fulfills its constitutional promise of
providing freedom of speech, however, demands for democracy by
both the Chinese people (albeit quiet people at times) and foreign
nations will persist. In the meantime, the tenacity of the Chinese
censor is convincing evidence that the PRC is merely giving lip
service to its constitutional guarantees of free speech. 381
V. CONCLUSION: SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM SUMMARIZED
The people and the government of the PRC have already
experienced a taste of free speech. At times during the 1980s and
1990s, the Chinese people were allowed to express their opinions
without the fear of imprisonment, expulsion from the country, or
possibly harsher punishments, and still the Communist Party and
socialist ideologies remained intact.382 As shown, the recently
reacquired region of Hong Kong flourished economically and
culturally within an atmosphere of free speech. 383 This example
proves that it is possible for a socialist society to thrive while
recognizing fundamental rights.384 Freedom of speech could be a
reality in the PRC, even if it is a somewhat limited type of freedom
379. See Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 33.
380. See STARR, supra note 6, at 204-05.
381. See Jakobson, supra note 33, at 4-5.
382. See discussion supra Part II.C-D.; see also 48 Journalists, supra note 4.
383. Neumann, supra note 196, at 3.
384. See id.
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according to Western standards. The government of the PRC
must be willing to make the necessary changes, however.
The PRC must abide by its constitutional and international
promises to provide freedom of speech. It must be willing to
either incorporate certain democratic ideals into its laws as was
done in Hong Kong, or find a way to reconcile socialist and
democratic beliefs. Either way, the international community is
willing to work alongside the PRC on many fronts, as evidenced by
the recent acceptance of the PRC into the WTO, as long as it
conforms to certain international norms and recognizes some basic
human rights.385 Allowing the people of the PRC access to
increased international information and exposing them to a
greater international environment would better educate them as to
the world in which they live. It would expand the PRC's exposure
within the business realm and, similarly to Hong Kong,
386
encourage a "rapid exchange of information" 387 that would further
benefit the Chinese economy. The government of the PRC has
the components in place to provide freedom of speech for the
people. Now it merely must adhere to its own, as well as
international, rules.
Likewise, the government must strengthen its judiciary by
providing it with the power of constitutional review. This power
must be removed from the control of the National People's
Congress and must be given to the judiciary to independently and
objectively review the country's laws. This will only work,
however, if the citizens of the PRC accept litigation as a viable
option to resolving their problems, and do not perceive it as a
shameful waste of time and money. The people prefer
arbitration,388 thus, it may be reasonable to allow Chinese judges
to mediate disputes in a less formal setting than a trial. This would
enable adequate review of the laws, while still making it possible
for the people to save face, which is a very important
consideration.
385. See Albright Press Briefing, supra note 241. As Secretary Albright and Assistant
Secretary Koh discuss, perhaps a system of U.N. incentives instead of sanctions could be
utilized in order to award the PRC for positive changes as opposed to punishing the
government for failing to change. Id.
386. See Neumann, supra note 196, at 3.
387. Id.
388. Peerenboom, supra note 198, at 54-55.
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The attitude of the people also plays an integral role in
whether freedom of speech could become a reality. Rights
consciousness in China is necessary to create an atmosphere of
rights advocacy. Apathy among the people permits the
government to continue with its abuses of power. The
government's constitutional violations and extreme responses to
dissonance lead to the fear of major consequences. This anxiety
creates a ripe environment for self-censorship. The people must
stand up for their right to free speech.
Finally, freedom of speech is an extremely important
fundamental right, but Western societies must remember that the
Chinese may not perceive such rights in the same way as do
Western cultures. Different values are placed upon different
rights. For example, the PRC focuses on economic and social
rights, while the West emphasizes civil and political rights.
Westerners must keep in mind the different legal, ideological, and
philosophical differences.
The PRC may never have a Westernized concept of freedom
of speech, but that does not mean such a freedom cannot exist in
some form. A Chinese version of free speech utilizing Chinese
beliefs may be an attainable option. For example, the government
could forego imprisoning dissidents, licensing and expelling
reporters, closing down media outlets, or harshly reacting to
criticism. Instead, it could create a system of increased arbitration
or mediation within the judicial system to settle disputes between
the media and the government. Compromises can be reached by
understanding the needs of each side. Although this may still
create tension with Western standards, such a system would at
least be a step towards free speech. The CCP trifled with the idea
of allowing freer speech in the 1990s, and the government suffered
no detrimental effects. If the government permanently
incorporated a practical approach to adhering to its constitutional
promise of free speech while applying principles satisfactory to
Chinese traditions and political structure, an adequate version of
free speech could be formulated.
Regardless of its form or how it is achieved, freedom of
speech is an important right. Suppressing it restrains people from
speaking their minds. Without a free flow of ideas, important
information could be lost, having never even been voiced or
considered. The government of the PRC could freely commit
atrocities, but these outrageous deeds would never be discussed,
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and therefore never stopped. Freedom of speech "augments
stability by providing a safety valve for tensions and social
pressures. It provides some of the means by which citizens
participate in decision making. It helps check abuse and
corruption." 389 The expression of dissonance as well as support is
necessary to foster a strong and cohesive country-neither should
be quelled.
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